secure exact-repair regenerating code problem, which generalizes the (n, k, d) exactrepair regenerating code problem with the additional constraint that the stored file needs to be kept information-theoretically secure against an eavesdropper, who can access the data transmitted to regenerate a total of different failed nodes. For all known results on this problem, the achievable tradeoff regions between the normalized storage capacity and repair bandwidth have a single corner point, achieved by a scheme proposed by Shah, Rashmi, and Kumar (the SRK point). Since the achievable tradeoff regions of the exact-repair regenerating code problem without any secrecy constraints are known to have multiple corner points in general, these existing results suggest a phasechange-like behavior, i.e., enforcing a secrecy constraint ( ≥ 1) immediately reduces the tradeoff region to one with a single corner point. In this paper, we first show that when the secrecy parameter is sufficiently large, the SRK point is indeed the only corner point of the tradeoff region. However, when is small, we show that the tradeoff region can in fact have multiple corner points. In particular, we establish a precise characterization of the tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem, which has exactly two corner points. Thus, a smooth transition, instead of a phasechange-type of transition, should be expected as the secrecy constraint is gradually strengthened.
repair mechanisms were started only recently by Dimakis et al. in their pioneering work [7] . A particular model, which has received a significant amount of attention in the literature, is the so-called exact-repair regenerating code problem.
More specifically, in an (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem, a file M of size B is to be encoded and then stored in a total of n distributed storage nodes, each of capacity α. The encoding needs to ensure that: 1) the file M can be perfectly recovered by having full access to any k out of the total n storage nodes; 2) when a node failure occurs, the failed node can be regenerated by extracting data of size β from each of an arbitrary set of d remaining nodes. An important technical contribution of [7] was to show that there is an inherent tradeoff between the node capacity α and the repair bandwidth β in satisfying both the file-recovery and node-regeneration requirements. In particular, it has been shown [8] [9] [10] that the achievable normalized storagecapacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for any (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem with k > 1 features multiple corner points including the all-important minimum storage rate (MSR) and minimum bandwidth rate (MBR) points. Fig. 1 illustrates the achievable normalized storagecapacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (4, 3, 3) exact-repair regenerating code problem, which features three corner points including the MSR point (1/3, 1/3) and the MBR point (1/2, 1/6). Despite intensive research efforts that have yielded many highly non-trivial partial results [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , the optimal tradeoffs between the node capacity α and repair bandwidth β have not been fully understood for the general (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem. 1 In this paper, we consider an extension of the aforementioned exact-repair regenerating code problem, which further requires certain security guarantee during the noderegeneration processes. More specifically, the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem that we consider is the standard (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , with the additional constraint that the file M needs to be kept information-theoretically secure against an eavesdropper that can access the data extracted to regenerate a total of different failed nodes (possibly under different repair groups). Apparently, this is only possible when < k. Furthermore, when = 0, the secrecy constraint degenerates, Fig. 1 . The regions above the solid and the dashed lines are the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff regions for the (4, 3, 3) exact-repair regenerating code and the (4, 3, 3, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problems, respectively. and the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem reduces to the (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem without any security constraints.
Under the additional secrecy constraint ( ≥ 1), the optimal tradeoffs between the node capacity α and repair bandwidth β have been studied in [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In particular, Shah, Rashmi and Kumar [15] showed that a particular tradeoff point (referred to as the SRK point) can be obtained by extending an MBR code based on the productmatrix construction proposed in [8] . Later, it was shown that the SRK point is the only corner point of the tradeoff region for the cases where we have either d = 2, 3 [19] , or d = 4 [20] , or k = 2 [19] , or = k − 1 = d − 1 [19] . This is in sharp contrast to the original exact-repair regenerating code problem [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] without any secrecy constraints, for which, as mentioned previously, the tradeoff region features multiple corner points when k > 1. Fig. 1 also illustrates the tradeoff region for the (4, 3, 3, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem, which features a single corner point at (1, 1/3). Thus, the existing results from [19] , [20] seem to suggest a phase-change-like behavior that enforcing a secrecy constraint immediately reduces the tradeoff region from one with multiple corner points ( = 0) to one with a single corner point ( ≥ 1).
The main results of this paper are two-folded.
• We first show, via new converse results, that for any given (k, d) pair, there is a lower bound on , denoted by * (k, d), such that when ≥ * (k, d), the SRK point is indeed the only conner point of the tradeoff region for the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem. As we shall see, the lower bound * (k, d) ≤ k − 1 for any (k, d) pair, and thus the tradeoff region for any (n, k, d, ) problem with = k − 1 or k = 2 must have a single corner point. In addition, the lower bound * (k, d) = 1 for any d ∈ [2 : 4] . Therefore, our result includes all previous results from [19] and [20] as special cases. • Next, we show that when 1 ≤ < * (k, d), it is entirely possible that the tradeoff region features multiple corner points. In particular, we establish a precise characterization of the tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem, which has exactly two corner points (see Fig. 2 for an illustration). This result requires new achievability results as well as new converse results, the former of which are obtained by extending the layered coding scheme proposed in [24] . From the viewpoint of the rate region, our result suggests that a smooth transition, instead of a phase-change-type of transition, should be expected as the secrecy constraint is gradually strengthened by increasing the parameter .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND KNOWN RESULTS
Let (n, k, d, N, K , T, S) be a tuple of positive integers such that n ≥ d + 1 ≥ k + 1 ≥ 2. Formally, an (n, k, d, N, K , T, S) code consists of: 
represent the message rate, storage capacity, and repair bandwidth, respectively.
A normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (ᾱ,β) is said to be achievable for the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem if an (n, k, d, N, K , T, S) code can be found such that:
• (rate normalization) α/B =ᾱ and β/B =β;
(1)
• (message recovery)
for any A ⊆ [1 : n] such that |A| = k; • (node regeneration)
for any B ⊆ [1 : n] such that |B| = d and j ∈ [1 : n] \ B; • (repair secrecy)
is the collection of data that can be extracted from the other nodes to regenerate node j . The closure of all achievable (ᾱ,β) pairs is the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region R n,k,d, for the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem.
In [15] , Shah, Rashmi and Kumar proved the following important achievability result for the general (n, k, d, ) secure regenerating code problem:
where
Note that when = 0 (no repair-secrecy constraint),
recovers the MBR point of the (n, k, d) exact-repair regenerating code problem [8] . It has been shown that the SRK point (5) is the only corner point of the tradeoff region R n,k,d, for the cases where we have either d = 2, 3 [19] , or d = 4 [20] , or k = 2 [19] , or = k − 1 = d − 1 [19] .
III. NEW RESULTS
Consider the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem (with ≥ 1), and let * (k, d) := min ≥ 1 :
Note that T k,d, is monotone non-increasing with respect to for any given (k, d) pair, so we have
We have the following two outer bounds for the tradeoff region R n,k,d, .
Theorem 1: For the general (n, k, d, ) secure exactrepair regenerating code problem, any achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (ᾱ,β) ∈ R n,k,d, must satisfy:β
In addition, when ≥ * (k, d), any achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (ᾱ,β) ∈ R n,k,d, must also satisfy:ᾱ
(Conversely, any (ᾱ,β) satisfying (9) and (10) is achievable.)
The proof of (9) is straightforward; a proof of (9) was previously given in [13] , [14] and is included here for completeness. On the other hand, the proof of (10) is long and technical. We shall defer the proofs to Section V to enhance the flow of the paper. Combining (9) and (10) proves that the SRK point (5) is the only corner point of the tradeoff region R n,k,d, when ≥ * (k, d). It is straightforward to verify that the lower bound * (k, d) ≤ k − 1 for any (k, d) pair and * (k, d) = 1 for d ∈ [2 : 4]. Therefore, Theorem 1 includes all previous results from [19] and [20] as special cases.
Next, we shift our attention to the cases where 1 ≤ < * (k, d). To see how the tradeoff region R n,k,d, may look like in this case, let us begin with the following achievability results for the (n, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem with k = d = n − 1.
Theorem 2: For any t ∈ [2 : n − ], we have
The proof is based on a new coding scheme, which we shall describe in the next section. Note that when = 1, (ᾱ t ,β t ) can be simplified as:
In this case, when t = 2, (ᾱ t ,β t ) coincides with the SRK point (5) with k = d = n − 1 and = 1. Furthermore, note thatβ t is monotone increasing with t, andᾱ t is monotone decreasing with t for any t ∈ [2 : n − 1] such that t 2 + t < n. Thus, no pairs of points from the set emerges in addition to the points (ᾱ 3 ,β 3 ) = 3 20 , 1 40 and (ᾱ 2 ,β 2 ) = 2 11 , 1 66 . Therefore, for the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem, the SRK point cannot be the only corner point when n ≥ 7.
Next, we show that both (ᾱ 2 ,β 2 ) and (ᾱ 3 ,β 3 ) are optimal tradeoff points for the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem when n ≥ 7, so in this case the tradeoff region must have multiple corner points.
Theorem 3: For the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem with n ≥ 7, any achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth pair (ᾱ,β) ∈ R n,n−1,n−1,1 must satisfy:
Note that both
satisfy the inequality (14) with equalities and hence cannot be dominated by a single achievable tradeoff point.
Finally, we focus on the (n, n − 1, n − 1, 1) problem with n = 7 and show that the tradeoff region has exactly two corner points at (ᾱ 2 ,β 2 ) and (ᾱ 3 ,β 3 ).
Theorem 4: For the (7, 6, 6, 1) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem, any achievable normalized storagecapacity repair-bandwidth pair (ᾱ,β) ∈ R 7,6,6,1 must satisfy:
Therefore, the tradeoff region R 7,6,6,1 is given by:
The proof of (14) and (15) can be found in Section V.
In this section, we provide a code construction based on the layered exact-repair regenerating codes proposed in [24] , which leads to the achievability of the tradeoff points given in Theorem 2.
Fix a parameter t, and consider the following scheme. There are a total of B = n− t (t − 1) information symbols, denoted as M, and there are a total of R = n t (t − 1) − B random symbols, denoted as K. Assume that an eavesdropper has access to the repair messages to an arbitrary set of nodes, the collection of which is denoted as E.
We first encode the (R + B) = n t (t −1) symbols (in a finite field F q such that q ≥ 2(R + B), and q will be used as the basis of the entropy function), into the parity check symbols of an (2(R + B), R + B) systematic MDS code. These R + B symbols are broken into a total of n t parity groups, each with (t − 1) symbols, and each parity group is associated with a subset A of [1 : n] of cardinality t.
Next, we expand each parity group by introducing one additional parity symbol which can be the simple linear sum of them, in the same finite field as earlier (or even in the binary field, assuming the original one is an extension of the binary field). These t symbols are then distributed into the subset of nodes associated with this parity group, one symbol to each node.
We need to show that the following three conditions are satisfied: 1) Reconstruction with any n − 1 nodes. This is trivial since in each parity group, at most one of them is in the failed node, and thus the contents of the parity group can be recovered. This also implies that
2) Repair with the remaining n − 1 nodes. Assume without loss of generality that node 1 fails. Then, to repair the symbol in the parity group associated with each A such that 1 ∈ A and |A| = t, we can send from the remaining nodes all the other symbols in this parity group. The total transmission is thus given by:
3) Security against any eavesdropper on nodes. We need to show that
Note that it suffices to show that I (M; E) ≤ 0 as Shannon's mutual information is always nonnegative. This follows from
All the parity groups that have symbols in the compromised nodes are completely revealed by accessing E, and conversely all the symbols in E can be generated by these parity groups alone. A total of n t − n− t parity groups are exposed, implying that
It remains to show that
which follows from the fact that given the eavesdropper's information and the message M, the random symbols K can be completely recovered. This can be seen as follows: there are a total of R symbols (after removing the simple sums in each parity group) from E that were original parity symbols of the (2 (R + B) , R + B) MDS code, but any R + B codeword symbols can be used to recover the original information (M, R), which we indeed have together with the B information symbols. Normalizing α t and β t by B proves the achievability of the tradeoff points given in Theorem 2.
V. PROOF OF THE CONVERSE RESULTS
A. Proof of (9) and (10) Let us first outline the main ingredients for proving the inequalities (9) and (10).
1) Total number of nodes. To prove the inequalities (9) and (10), let us first note that these two inequalities are independent of the total number of storage nodes n in the system. In our proof, we only need to consider the cases where n = d + 1. For the cases where n > d + 1, since any subsystem consisting of d + 1 out of the total n storage nodes must give rise to a (d + 1, k, d, ) secure exact-repair regenerating code problem. Therefore, these two inequalities as outer bounds must apply as well. When n = d + 1, any repair group B of size d is uniquely determined by the node j to be repaired, i.e., B = [1 : n] \ { j }, and hence can be dropped from the notation S B i→ j without causing any confusion. 2) Code symmetry. Due to the built-in symmetry of the problem, to prove the inequalities (9) and (10), we only need to consider the so-called symmetrical codes [11] for which the joint entropy of any subset of random variables from
remains unchanged under any permutation over the storage-node indices. 3) Key collections of random variables. Focusing on the symmetrical (n = d + 1, d, N, K , T, S) codes, the following collections of random variables play a key role in our proof: In particular, the collection U t,s defined in (30) was first identified in [25] for proving that separate encoding can achieve the MBR point for multilevel diversity coding with regeneration. As we shall see, here it also plays a key role in our proof of (9) and (10). Fig. 3 illustrates the structure of U 0,4 , U 1,4 and U 2,4 in the repair diagram introduced by Duursma [12] for n = 5.
An important part of the proof is to understand the relations between the collections of random variables defined above, and to use them to derive the desired converse results. We have the following key lemmas, whose proof can be found in the Appendix. We mention here that the secrecy constraint (4) does not play any role in these lemmas, and hence they can be applied to the standard exact-repair regenerating code problem as well. The above lemma demonstrates the "compactness" of U t,s and has a number of direct consequences. For example, for any fixed s ∈ [1 : n], it is clear from Lemma 1 that U t 2 ,s is a function of U t 1 ,s and hence H (U t 2 ,s ) ≤ H (U t 1 ,s ) for any 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ s − 1. The following lemma quantifies the "information difference" between U t,s and U t,k for t ∈ [1 : 2] and s ∈ [2 : k − 1].
Lemma 2: For any symmetrical (n = d + 1, k, d, N, K , T, S) code, we have
for any t ∈ [1 : 2], j ∈ [2 : k], and m ∈ [1 : j − t + 1].
The following lemma provides yet another quantification of the "information difference" between U t,s and U t,k for t = 1 and s ∈ [2 : k − 1].
Lemma 3: For any symmetrical (n = d + 1, k, d, N, K , T, S) code that satisfies the node-regeneration requirement (3), we have 
where (a) follows from the fact that
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; (b) is due to the storage-capacity constraint H (W 1 ) ≤ α; (c) is due to the fact that S 1→[2: +1] is a function of W 1 ; (d) follows from the fact that
due to the submodularity of the entropy function; (e) follows from the fact that
and ( f ) follows from the facts that
and
Applying (31) from Lemma 2 with (t, j, m) = (1, + 1, ) and (t, j, m) = (1, , ), respectively gives:
and 
and we have
It follows that The first term on the right-hand side of (41) can be further bounded from below by the fact that U 2, +1 is a function of U 1, +1 by Lemma 1, so we have
To bound from below the second term on the right-hand side of (41), note that by the definition of q in (40) we have
where (a) follows from the fact that S +1→1 is a function of W +1 , which is in turn a function of U 1, +1 by Lemma 1; (b) follows from (32) of Lemma 3 with ( j, m) = ( +1, +1); (c) is due to the storage-capacity constraint H (W +1 ) ≤ α; (d) follows from the fact that S +1→[1: ] is a function of W +1 ;
(e) follows from the fact that
due to the submodularity of the entropy function; ( f ) follows yet again from the fact that S +1→1 is a function of W +1 ; (g) follows from the fact that
due to the symmetrical code that we consider; and (h) follows from the fact that U 2,k is a function of U 1,k by Lemma 1, so we have
Further note that
where (a) follows from the fact that S →[2: ] is a function of U 1, by Lemma 1; (b) follows from the symmetry of the code that we consider (by swapping the node indices 2 and +1); and (c) follows from the fact that S →[3: +1] is a function of U 2, +1 again by Lemma 1. Substituting (47) into (43) gives:
Substituting (42) and (48) into (41) gives: 
where (a) and (c) follow from the fact that
is a function of U 2,k by Lemma 1; (e) follows from the fact that M is a function of W [1:k] due to the message-recover constraint (2); ( f ) follows from the fact that + 2 ≤ k in this case; (g) is due to the secrecy constraint (4); and (h) follows from the fact that
due to the symmetrical code that we consider. Canceling d H (S →[1: ] ) from both sides of the inequality completes the proof of (10) for
B. Proof of (14) Assume that k = d = n − 1 and = 1. In addition, we shall also assume without loss of generality that the codes that we consider here are symmetrical ones. Let us begin with the following lemma that performs simple decompositions of S →1 , whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 4: For any symmetrical (n, k = n − 1, d = n − 1, N, K , T, S) code and any i ∈ [1 : n − 1], we have
Now setting i = 2, 3 in (51) gives: Furthermore, by the repair-bandwidth constraint, we have
Adding (54) and (55) gives:
where the last equality follows from the change of variable i → n − i . To proceed, we shall need the following lemma, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 5: For any symmetrical (n, k = n − 1, d = n − 1, N, K , T, S) code that satisfies the node-regeneration requirement (3) and the repair-secrecy constraint (4) with = 1, we have
Adding (56) and (57) gives:
Canceling 3H (S →1 ) from both sides and normalizing the remaining terms by B complete the proof of (14) .
C. Proof of (15)
Let us first show that
which can be seen as follows. Setting i = 4 in (50), we have
Setting n = 7 and i = 2, 3 in (51), we have
and H (S →1 ) ≥ H (S →3 |W [1:2] ) + H (S →5 |W [1:4] 
where (a) follows from (62) = 3H (W [1:7] , M, S →1 ) ≥ 3H (M, S →1 )
where (a) follows from (58); (b) follows from (63); (c) follows from (64); (d) follows from the node-capacity constraint; (e) follows from the fact that H (U 2,6 ) ≥ H (W [1:6] ) due to Lemma 1; ( f ) follows from the facts that M is a function of W [1:6] due to the message-recovery requirement (2) and that W 7 is a function of S →7 , which is in turn a function of W [1:6] ; (g) follows from the fact that S →1 is a function of W [2:7] ; and (h) follows from the repair-secrecy constraint (4) with = 1. Canceling 3H (S →1 ) from both sides and normalizing the remaining terms by B complete the proof of (15) for the case where α ≥ H (S [2:4]→1 ).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we considered the (n, k, d, ) secure exactrepair regenerating code problem, which has been previously studied in [13] , [15] , [17] , [19] , [20] . We proved that when the secrecy parameter is sufficiently large, the SRK point [15] is the only corner point of the achievable normalized storagecapacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region. This includes all previous results from [19] and [20] as special cases. On the other hand, when is small, we showed that it is entirely possible that the achievable normalized storage-capacity repairbandwidth tradeoff region features multiple corner points. In particular, we showed that the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region for the (7, 6, 6, 1) problem has exactly two corner points. This suggests a much "smoother" transition, in terms of the rate region, from the original exact-repair regenerating code problem to the secrecy extension than that suggested by the previous results from [19] and [20] .
The question whether (8) is also necessary for the SRK point [15] to be the only corner point of the achievable normalized storage-capacity repair-bandwidth tradeoff region remains open. Significant research is also needed to further understand how the tradeoff region R n,k,d, may look like when is small (the non-secrecy case with = 0 remains open and appears to be very challenging). In particular, one may consider generalizing the code construction given in Section IV, which was based on the so-called canonical layered codes proposed in [24] for the case of k = d = n − 1. The canonical layered codes have been generalized to the cases where d < n −1 and k < d in [24] , and further improvements can also be found in [26] . Following the approach used in Section IV, the code constructions from [24] and [26] can be similarly adapted into constructions that satisfy the repair-secrecy requirement. The optimalities of these code constructions are currently under our investigations.
for any j ∈ [2 : k −1] and t ∈ [ j : k −1], then for any j ∈ [2 : 
